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I.

SUMMARY

Most of the material facts are undisputed. The disputed facts are for the jury to resolve.
Applying Idaho law to the undisputed and disputed facts, a reasonable juror could find the POA
liable based on (1) premises liability, (2) voluntary undertaking, and (3) agency theories; and
could find Mr. Kalsbeek liable for his voluntary undertakings. Therefore, this Court should
reverse the summary judgments. 1
Part A shows that Appellants preserved the issues on appeal by making virtually identical
arguments below.2 Part B shows that Respondents exercised actual control at Sagecrest, and in
particular over (1) hard-wired CO detector installation; (2) professional preventative
maintenance; and (3) warnings to owners and tenants. Whether that actual control was also
rightful is irrelevant, but in any event Respondents had authority over these matters. Part C
shows that Respondents owed duties and can be held liable for actually exercising control in a
manner that led to Ms. Halowell suffering a severe brain injury and Mr. Forbush being killed.

Because the summary judgments should be reversed, Respondents' requests for
attorney's fees should be denied. No party litigated this appeal frivolously or unreasonably.
Firmage v. Snow, 158 Idaho 343, 351, 347 P.3d 191, 199 (2015). The factual and legal issues
are complex. Even the District Court found this case challenging, reversing its initial decision
denying summary judgment for the POA. Recognizing this, Appellants did not request fees from
Respondents.
2

With the exception of the issue of whether Mr. Kalsbeek owed premises-liability
duties, which Appellants hereby withdraw.

1

U.
A.

ARGUMENT

Appellants preserved the arguments on appeal.
1.

Appellants properly pied their claims.

The POA suggests without support that Appellants did not plead premises-liability and
voluntary-undertaking duties. POA Br. at 3 n. l, 8. Under Idaho's notice-pleading standard,3
Appellants adequately pled premises-liability and voluntary-undertaking duties by pleading the
facts giving rise to these duties. "Under notice pleading, a party is no longer slavishly bound to
stating particular theories in its pleadings." Navo v. Bingham A1em 'l Hosp., 160 Idaho 363, 375,
373 P.3d 681, 693 (2016) (quotation omitted). "It is well-established that '[a] complaint need
only contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for
relief.' " Skinner v. US. Bank Home Mortgage, 159 Idaho 642, 650 n.2, 365 P.3d 398, 406 n.2
(2016) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). "[E]ven if a complaint does not specifically
state a given cause of action, it can satisfy the pleading requirement so long as the factual
allegations themselves could fairly put the opposing party on notice of the claim against it."
Pierce v. McMullen, 156 Idaho 465, 473-74, 328 P.3d 445, 453-54 (2014) (alteration in original)

(quotation omitted). Here, the operative Complaint sets forth ample facts for imposing duties on

The POA failed to cite the legal standard for pleading and therefore waived any
argument that Appellants' pleading was inadequate. See Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge
Med. Inv 'r, LLC, 157 Idaho 732, 743, 339 P.3d 1136, 1147 (2014) ("A party waives an issue
cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking .... " (quotation omitted)).

2

Respondents. R. pp. 601-25. Indeed, the POA quoted numerous relevant allegations. See POA
Br. at 2-3 (quoting R. pp. 612-13). 4

2.

Appellants preserved their premises-liability arguments against the POA.

The POA confusingly claims that because the Appellants withdrew failure to install a

new water heater as a factual basis for imposing premises liability duties, they somehow
withdrew their entire premises liability claim. POA Br. at 15-16. Not so. A party's decision not
to pursue one factual basis for a particular claim does not somehow waive the entire claim. The
POA further claims that Appellants are raising premises liability for the first time on appeal. Id.
at 16. Appellants clearly argued premises liability below. See R. pp. 352-55, 810-12. 5

3.

Appellants preserved their voluntary-undertaking arguments.

The POA claims that Appellants failed to preserve their voluntary-undertaking
arguments. POA Br. at 22-23. That is false. Appellants argued below that the POA dominated
FRPM and directed its actions, thereby assuming voluntary-undertaking duties:
By implementing a false and dangerous response protocol, which prevented
others from responding in a safer and more reasonable manner, the POA
increased the likelihood that someone at the property would be poisoned by CO.
The POA actively stymied the response efforts by others. For instance, First Rate
suggested hiring a professional plumber to maintain/clean the filters in the water
4

Moreover, the District Court did not rule that Appellants inadequately pled
premises-liability or voluntary-undertaking duties; nor did it reach the secondary question of
whether, if these duties were not adequately pled, leave to amend would be proper.
5

The POA' s contention that there was no adverse ruling below is nonsensical.
POA Br. at 16. The District Court necessarily rejected premises liability as a theory of recovery;
otherwise it would not have granted summary judgment for the POA.

3

heaters (to decrease the risk that a water heater would clog and fail), yet the POA
prevented this fix from being implemented. Later, First Rate sought to have a
handy-man contractor go door-to-door to ensure that each and every apartment
unit had a functioning CO detector to warn of a possible CO exposure; but the
POA rejected this idea. Because the POA exerted absolute control over the
property manager's operation and management at the property, First Rate did not
even seek owner input on issues like this - the POA made the call. In doing so,
the POA increased the risk that tenants or their guests would be poisoned.
Consistent with §§ 323 and 324A [which discuss voluntary undertakings], the
POA owed Plaintiffs a duty because it voluntarily assumed duties and then
increased the danger of a CO incident.
R. p. 816. 6

B.

There are ample facts from which a reasonable juror could find that Respondents
dominated FRPM and had control over (1) hard-wired CO detector installation; (2)
professional preventative maintenance; and (3) warnings to owners and tenants.
1.

Respondents had financial leverage over FRPM that enabled Respondents to
dominate FRPM.

The key facts regarding Respondents' financial leverage over FRPM are undisputed. It is
undisputed that Sagecrest was FRPM's largest account ever.
undisputed that all owners, including Mr. Switzer -

Appellants' Br. at 4.

It is

an excepting only four "grandfathered"

buildings that were under other management prior to the CCR's

were required to employ the

same property manager that the POA employed. Id. at 5 & n.3. It is undisputed that the POA,
through Mr. Kalsbeek, determined whether on-site FRPM employees would be paid to work
overtime, including on unit-interior issues. Id. at 5-6.
However, there are some factual disputes regarding Respondents' leverage over FRPM:
6

The fact that the District Court addressed in its Order whether others besides Ms.
Kipper relied on the POA, see Appellants' Br. at 19 n.13 (citing R. p. 987), is further evidence
that this issue was preserved.

4

Payment of Wages:

Mr. Kalsbeek disputes that the POA paid FRPM's on-site

employees' wages, noting that the POA-FRPM7 Agreement § 5.1 limits such payment to those
employees "fully assigned to the [POA's] premises and fully dedicated to the [POA's] business .
. . ." Kalsbeek Br. at 5. This begs the question of what premises the POA exerted control over
and what business it undertook. At any rate, an email exchange shows that the POA paid FRPM
leasing manager Tara Gaertner' s wages, regardless of what the Agreement specified. R. p. 710
(refusing to pay Ms. Gaertner overtime).
Replacement of Property Manager: The POA asserts that, under CCR's § 6.6A, a vote of
75% of owners was required to remove and replace the property manager.
Section 6.6A states: "[t]his said management company" which was FRPM' s predecessor

POA Br. at 11.

i.e. H & H Property Management,

"at any time could be removed from this management with a

75% vote from the current members .... " R. p. 96. First, the plain text of§ 6.6A permitted an
owner vote, but did not separately forbid action by the POA Board. Second, § 6.6A addresses
removal of H & H -

i.e. "[t]his said management company." It is silent on the methods for

removing any subsequent property manager, such as FRPM. Third, the POA Board did in fact
accept FRPM' s resignation, investigate new property managers, and select Verity Property
Management as FRPM's successor -

all without any prior notice to, or vote by, the owners.

Appellants' Br. at 5 n.4 (citing R. p. 841 ). The POA Board did not follow any vote requirement.

Mr. Kalsbeek cited to the ,r 5.1 of the Switzer-FRPM Agreement at R. p. 106, but
apparently intended to cite to ,r 5.1 of the POA-FRPM Agreement at R. p. 100.
7

5

While some details of Respondents' financial leverage over FRPM are disputed, the key
facts are not, and there is ample evidence from which a jury could find that Respondents had
financial leverage over FRPM.

2.

The witness testimony evidencing control cannot be disregarded based on
allegations of bias - witness credibility is an issue for the jury, and
Respondents' witness testimony is also biased.

FRPM owner Tony Drost, maintenance supervisor Sheila Thomason, and leasing
manager Tara Gaertner testified that Mr. Kalsbeek micromanaged numerous activities in unit
interiors. Mr. Kalsbeek micromanaged dishwasher replacement, CO testing, and filter changes
and even demanded a detailed daily logbook of all of FRPM's activities. Appellants' Br. at 34. Respondents do not directly dispute that testimony.
The POA characterizes this testimony as a "veiled attempt" by the witnesses to shift
blame from FRPM_ to the POA. POA Br. at 9, 24-25. The POA's argument boils down to an
assertion that the testimony is not credible because the FRPM employees were biased.
Credibility cannot be weighed on summary judgment. See Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 150
Idaho 664, 674, 249 P.3d 857, 867 (2011) ("[J]udging credibility is not appropriate during
summary judgment proceedings where no evidentiary hearing has been held."). It is for the jury
to determine whose version of events is more credible. 8

8

When doing so, the jury may take into account corroborating evidence - such as
the numerous communications in which Mr. Kalsbeek asserted control over FRPM. See, e.g., R.
pp. 457-59, 710, 838-39.

6

3.

Control over water heater replacement is irrelevant in this appeal.

Appellants' Opening Brief was quite clear that Respondents exercised control over three
areas: (1) hard-wired CO detector installation; (2) professional preventative maintenance; and (3)
warnings to owners and tenants. Respondents discuss at length an irrelevant fourth issue control over water heater replacement. POA Br. at 10, 14, 17, 27 n.7, 32-33; Kalsbeek Br. at 69. That is not an issue in this appeal.

4.

Respondents had control over hard-wired CO detector installation.

Most of the key facts showing Respondents' control over hard-wired CO detector
installation are undisputed. It is undisputed that Mr. Kalsbeek, as POA President, established
written Procedures for piecemeal hard-wired CO detector installation. Appellants' Br. at 8-9. It
is undisputed that Mr. Kalsbeek stated that owner approval was not required for installation of
hard-wired CO detectors under his Procedures. Id. at 9. It is undisputed that hard-wired CO
detectors could have been installed in a single day prior to the poisoning. Id. at 11 n.7.
The POA attempts to generate a factual dispute by misconstruing exchanges between Mr.
Kalsbeek, Mr. Drost, and Ms. Gaertner during their October 25, 2012 meeting (the transcript of
which appears on pages 413 to 419 of the Record).
First, the POA claims that Ms. Gaertner admitted that installing hard-wired CO detectors
was her responsibility. POA Br. at 20. She did not. The POA deleted the emphasized words in
Ms. Gaertner's quotation, changing its meaning:

7

I mean, I understand that it's the owners' decision 'cause it's the owners' money
we're spending. 9 But as far as the fire department's concerned, I'm the manager
and it's my responsibility.
R. p. 414 at Transcript p. 11, LL 2-5. Ms. Gaertner' s speculation about the fire department's
perception of her role is not evidence of the actual allocation of responsibility.
Second, the POA suggests that it was FRPM's lack of diligence Kalsbeek's piecemeal installation Procedures -

rather than Mr.

that delayed installation of a hard-wired CO

detector in Unit 4624. POA Br. at 21. Yet again, the POA misconstrues what the meeting
participants actually said.

Ms. Gaertner did not say that FRPM was unable to install CO

detectors because it was too "swamped" to do so.

Rather, Mr. Kalsbeek's Procedures tied

installation to sporadic events such as turnovers and preventative maintenance. FRPM had been
too swamped to do full preventative maintenance:
Mr. Drost: We haven't done preventative maintenance.
Ms. [Gaertner]: All summer.
Mr. Drost: Right and Ms. [Gaertner]: 'Cause we've been swamped.
R. p. 415 at Transcript p. 15, LL 6-10.

Because there was a bottleneck in preventative

maintenance, Ms. Gaertner reasonably suggested separating CO detector installation from
preventative maintenance, and fast-tracking installations:
So there are still some units that, obviously, don't have them [hard-wired CO
detectors] in them. So those units I would like Chris to go through and install one
just so we're all safe, the tenants, us, the Association, everybody.
R. p. 415 at Transcript p. 16, LL 10-13 . 10
9

Mr. Kalsbeek corrected Ms. Gaertner on this, stating that there was "absolutely
nothing about owners' approval" in his Procedures. R. p. 415 at Transcript p. 14, LL 2-18.

8

Even after he was indisputably aware of the slow pace of hard-wired CO detector
installation under his Procedures, Mr. Kalsbeek reaffirmed them. R. p. 416 at Transcript p. 17,
LI. 15-16.

Had Mr. Kalsbeek heeded Ms. Gaertner' s request to fast-track CO detector

installation, this tragedy would not have happened.

5.

Respondents had control over professional preventative maintenance.

Yet again, most of the key facts are undisputed. It is undisputed that Ms. Gaertner
informed Mr. Kalsbeek that it was necessary for a professional plumber to preform preventative
maintenance, that Ms. Gaertner forwarded him cost estimates and asked for permission to hire a
plumber, that Mr. Kalsbeek promised that the POA would review the request and "get back to
you next week," but that Mr. Kalsbeek failed to grant permission. Appellants' Br. at 11.
Mr. Kalsbeek states that his email on page 424 of the Record "speaks for itself."
Kalsbeek Br. at 23. But a reasonable juror could find that Mr. Kalsbeek's pointed series of
rhetorical questions was an objection to hiring a professional plumber based on cost.

Mr.

Kalsbeek has not established as a matter of law that this interpretation is wrong. Yet again, there
are disputed facts and inferences for the jury to decide.

10

Ms. Gaertner's suggestion at the October 25 meeting is consistent with her
October 11 email to Mr. Kalsbeek. Appellants' Br. at 9 (quoting R. p. 704). It is also consistent
with a draft email Ms. Gaertner wrote. Appellants' Br. at 10 n.5 (quoting R. p. 442 ("I
recommend putting CO combo detectors in every unit and be done with it.")).

9

6.

Respondents had control over warnings to owners and tenants.

Once more, most of the key facts are undisputed.

It is undisputed that that Mr.

Kalsbeek's instruction to Ms. Thomason was the only thing that prevented her from sending the
Ben Davis Letter to all owners. It is undisnuted
that the Ben Davis Letter stark Iv
,
. warned of an
imminent risk of death due to CO poisoning at Sagecrest. Respondents do not even dispute that
a juror could reasonably infer that, had owner Matthew Switzer or tenant Adra Kipper received
the Ben Davis Letter, they would have taken protective action. Appellants' Br. at 12-13.

a.

The information provided to owners was insufficient to warn them of
an imminent threat of death.

The POA conflates the limited information that Ms. Gaertner provided (and to which Mr.
Kalsbeek later objected) with the urgent Ben Davis Letter that Ms. Thomason did not provide
(due to Mr. Kalsbeek's command not to). POA Br. 28-29 (citing R. pp. 447-48, 488-90). The
information that Ms. Gaertner sent was not the Ben Davis Letter, was significantly less dire, and
did not warn of the imminent risk of death. 11 R. pp. 44 7 (Ms. Gaertner' s email to Mr. Kalsbeek
stating that she had already provided a chart discussing effects of various levels of CO exposure
in the abstract), 489-90 (Ms. Gaertner' s email to owners generally suggesting repairs, but not
warning of imminent risk of death). A reasonable juror could find that, although Mr. Kalsbeek
was too late to prevent Ms. Gaertner from sending some limited information, he prevented Ms.
Thomason from sending an adequate warning of the deadly threat.

II

The POA further suggests that the Ben Davis Letter was "erroneous." POA Br. at
29. There is no support for this in the record. It is yet another disputed issue for the jury.

10

b.

Although Ms. Gaertner provided limited information to owners
before Mr. Kalsbeek objected, Mr. Kalsbeek's email ordering Ms.
Gaertner to desist is a clear assertion of control over warnings.

The POA attempts to re-characterize the email exchange between Mr. Kalsbeek and Ms.
Gaertner on pages 447-48 of the Record.

POA Br. at 14. First, the POA asserts that Mr.

Kalsbeek believed that the information Ms. Gaertner provided to owners was inaccurate. Id.
Second, the POA correctly notes that Ms. Gaertner sent some limited information to owners. Id.
There is no support in the record that Mr. Kalsbeek was right and Ms. Gaertner was
wrong. This is yet another disputed issue for the jury. And, regardless of who was right, Mr.
Kalsbeek instructed Ms. Gaertner not to send it. R. p. 448. That is a clear assertion of control
(although Ms. Gaertner then clarified that she had already sent the information). R. p. 447.
Tellingly, she feared she would face serious consequences for acting without Mr. Kalsbeek's
prior permission. id. (informing FRPM general manager "there's about to be as--- storm").

7.

Respondents had authority to exercise control.

It is irrelevant whether Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA's exercise of control over hard-wired
CO detector installation, professional preventative maintenance, and warnings to owners and
tenants was with, or without, proper authority. See Appellants' Br. at 15-16 & n.11, 24-25. A
defendant who could otherwise be held liable due to his or her exercise of control does not enjoy
immunity merely because that exercise of control was without rightful authority. Thus, it is not
necessary for the Court to wade into the authority question. However, to the extent that the
Court determines that this inquiry is necessary, the CCR's either plainly gave the POA power to

11

control these three issues -

or at a mm1mum the CCR' s are ambiguous, making their

interpretation a jury question. Appellants' Br. at 16-17.

a.

Section 3.8 applies to unit interiors. 12

It is undisputed that CCR's §§ 3.3 and 3.5 gave the POA control over most parts of unit
exteriors and gave unit owners control over unit interiors. It is undisputed that FRPM contracted
with owners to repair and maintain their unit interiors

and even to make repairs under $250

without prior owner approval. But § 3.8 provided a mechanism for the POA to override that
division of authority and to exercise control over unit interiors. CCR's § 3.8 gave the POA the
power to determine that an owner was not maintaining "any portion" of his or her property in "a
manner reasonabl[y] satisfactory to the Board." In such instances the POA could "enter upon the
Residential Lot or Four Plex and repair, maintain and restore the Residential Lot, or the Four
including through the POA's agent, FRPM. Appellants' Br. at 6-7 (quoting R. p. 70).

Plex"

The POA ignores § 3.8's text, and instead relies on its own interpretation of other sections and
documents in an effort to limit § 3.8 to unit exteriors. 13
Section 3.8: The POA relies on the District Court's Order for the proposition that § 3.8
applies to unit exteriors only. POA Br. at 11. This interpretation is incompatible with § 3.8's
12

Even if only rightful control as opposed to actual control were relevant, and even
if the CCR's did not give Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA rightful control over unit interiors, that
would still have no bearing on the third area over which Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA exercised
control: warnings to owners and tenants. Warnings are not maintenance or repairs in a unit
interior, and Respondents have never pointed to any provision that supposedly limited their
authority to control warnings.
13

Ironically, the POA later relies on testimony that § 3.8 allowed the POA to "K.Q
into a unit and make repairs." POA Br. at 18 (citing R. p. 116 at Dep. Tr. p. 77, Ll. 2-17
(emphasis added)). This confirms that§ 3.8 gave the POA authority to "go into" unit interiors.
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plain text. Section 3.8 applies to the entire "Residential Lot, or the Four Plex" if an owner fails
to maintain "any portion of such Owner's Residential Lot that Owner is responsible to maintain"
to the POA's satisfaction. Appellants' Br. at 6-7 (quoting R. p. 70). The word "exterior" does
not appear in § 3.8. Rather, the broad phrase "any portion" means what it says.
The POA then offers its own gloss on § 3.8, claiming that it was intended to allow the
POA to remedy "dilapidated exterior[s]" that could lower property values. POA Br. at 11. The
POA does not cite anything in the record supporting its incongruous interpretation. The POA
indisputably controlled almost all aspects of exterior maintenance.

Not only is the POA's

reading of§ 3.8 textually unsupported, it would also render§ 3.8 almost entirely superfluous.
Section 3.5: Respondents note that CCR's § 3.5 gives owners an "exclusive right" to
maintain unit interiors. Kalsbeek Br. 3, 18 (citing R. p. 540); POA Br. 4-5 (citing R. p. 69), 30. 14
That right, however, is subject to § 3.8. At best for Respondents, that § 3.5 gives owners an
exclusive right, and then § 3 .8 limits that right, creates ambiguity for the jury to resolve.
Section 3.6: The POA claims that CCR's § 3.6 gives the POA an easement for access to
unit exteriors only. POA Br. at 4. Actually § 3.6 gives the POA: "an irrevocable easement for
purposes of access to and upon each Residential Lot and Four Plex .... " R. p. 69. There is no
limitation to unit exteriors.
POA-FRPM Agreement: The POA claims that the POA-FRPM Agreement limited the
scope of FRPM's responsibilities to the POA to "day-to-day administrative duties . . . for
common areas." POA Br. at 5, 19 (citing R. p. 98-102, 141). However, 13.1 of the POA-FRPM
14

Identical copies of the CCR's appear in the Record at 64 to 96 and 535 to 567.

13

Agreement authorized the POA to select contractors performing maintenance at "the property,"
and in

,r

3.4 FRPM contracted with the POA to take action "reasonable and appropriate in the

event of any emergency . . . which may . .
Pronertv." R. n. 98-99. Onlv unit interiors
i

.,I

.J.

..,

tenants or occupants. Therefore
authority under the CCR' s -

cause injury to tenants and occupants of the
not unit exteriors or common areas -

have

to the extent that the Agreement is relevant to the POA's

the Agreement confirms the POA' s authority.

Switzer-FRPM Agreement: Similarly, the POA relies on the fact that the Switzer-FRPM
Agreement gave FRPM authority to repair and maintain Mr. Switzer's units on his behalf
some instances without prior approval.

m

POA Br. at 5 (citing R. p. 104-13). Mr. Switzer's

control does not disprove the POA's parallel control over the three matters at issue in this appeal.

b.

Honor system limitations are not real limitations.

The POA argues that CCR's § 3.8 included procedural limitations on its unfettered
discretion to deem an owner's maintenance unsatisfactory and to repair, maintain, and restore
any portion of a Four-Plex, including through its agent FRPM. POA Br. at 11. Specifically, the
POA Board was supposed to formally vote and hold a hearing before taking action pursuant to §
3.8. But no provision allowed an owner to oppose the POA Board's actions on the grounds that
Board had not formally voted and held a hearing. Thus, nothing more than the honor system
limited the Board's authority here.
This case exemplifies that the honor system is not a real limitation on an entity's power.
For example: Mr. Kalsbeek insisted that there was "absolutely nothing about owners' approval"
in his Procedures for hard-wired CO detector installation. R. p. 415 at Transcript p. 14, LL 2-18.
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Arguably, Mr. Kalsbeek should have put his Procedures to a formal POA Board vote and then
afforded owners a hearing before imposing his Procedures. But, he didn't, and FRPM followed
his Procedures. It would be a remarkable and unfortunate development in Idaho law if this Court
held that a party could avoid liability by the simple expedient of failing to adhere to proper
protocol when making tortious decisions.

C.

Respondents owed duties based on their actual control over: (1) hard-wired CO
detector installation; (2) professional preventative maintenance; and (3) warnings to
owners and tenants.
1.

The POA owed premises liability duties.
a.

Premises liability duties are proportional to control over the premises.

The POA asserts without citing any supporting authority that an entity cannot owe a
partial premises liability duty. POA Br. 15. The POA does not even attempt to address the cases
that Appellants cited, which hold that premises liability duties are proportional to a party's
control. Appellants' Br. at 15-16. By failing to cite any contrary authority, the POA has waived
this issue. See Pocatello Hosp., 157 Idaho at 743,339 P.3d at 1147.
b.

The POA had control over dangerous conditions.

The POA claims that control over detector installation, maintenance, and warnings are
not valid bases for imposing premises liability duties, because these are not "dangerous
conditions or activities on the property." POA Br. at 16. According to the POA, only the water
heater itself was a dangerous condition. Id. This argument is perplexing. A hard-wired CO
detector would have protected Ms. Halowell and Mr. Forbush from being poisoned by the water
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heater.

Professional preventative maintenance, to stop the water heater from clogging and

emitting CO, would also have prevented this poisoning. So too would an effective warning to
Mr. Switzer or Ms. Kipper. Thus, even though the POA did not assert the authority to replace
the water heater. it controlled relevant asoects of the oremises that could have nrotected arrainst
/

..L

..L

.J,

4-)

harm caused by the water heater.

c.

Regardless of whether the POA had rightful control, it had actual
control.

The POA then returns to its familiar refrain that

regardless of the fact that it actually

exercised control over unit interiors, it supposedly owed no duty because it lacked rightful
control. POA Br. at 16-19. As support, the POA cites McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc.,
151 Idaho 280, 255 P.3d 1166 (2011). POA Br. at 17-18. However, in McDevitt there was no
evidence that the defendant store exercised any actual control over the sidewalk (the defective
premises in that case). Although the store sometimes parked hot dog stands and display trailers
on the sidewalk, it was only with the owner's approval. Id at 286, 255 P.3d at 1172.
Here, in contrast, the POA implemented written Procedures specifying a piecemeal
schedule for hard-wired CO detector installation that -

according to Mr. Kalsbeek himself -

included "absolutely nothing about owners' approval" and were "not optional." R. p. 415 at
Transcript p. 14, LL 2-18; R. p. 418 at Transcript p. 98, L. 25 to p. 99, L. 1. Moreover, the POA
did not seek owner input on the decision of whether to hire a professional plumber to perform
preventative maintenance. And, furthermore, the POA actively prevented FRPM from sharing
warnings with owners. Thus, in contrast to McDevitt

where the owner exercised full control
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over the sidewalk, and all actions that the defendant store took were with the owner's permission
-

here the POA exercised control without the owners' permission.

d.

Stiles confirms the POA's premises liability duties.

The POA suggests that, pursuant to this Court's recent decision in Stiles v. Amundson,
160 Idaho 530, 376 P.3d 734 (2016), only Ms. Kipper owed any duty.

POA Br. at 19-20.

Because the POA had control over relevant aspects of the premises and knowledge of the CO
threat, whereas Ms. Kipper did not, Stiles confirms that the POA owed premises liability duties.
Ms. Kipper lacked control over relevant aspects of the premises. Her lease forbade her
from making repairs or altering the premises in any way. R. pp. 192 at ,i 39, 197 at ,i 82. There
is no evidence that Ms. Kipper (unlike Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA) exercised control regardless
of what her lease said. Moreover, Ms. Kipper was not aware of an ongoing CO threat. She was
told that her water heater was being replaced and reasonably believed any threat had been
eliminated. Appellants' Br. at 13 n.9.

Stiles adopted the Court of Appeals' reasoning in Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 237,
322 P.3d 319 (Ct. App. 2014) -

including quoting with approval that "it is the entity having

control over the property that bears the burden of warning social guests and licensees of
dangerous conditions on the property." Stiles, 160 Idaho at 533, 376 P.3d at 737 (emphasis
added) (quoting Robinson, 156 Idaho at 240, 322 P.3d at 322).
A rental agreement typically shifts control over repairs from landlords to tenants. Id.
Moreover, tenants typically are better able to detect hazards on the premises than are landlords.

Id. at 533-34, 376 P.3d at 737-38. Because tenants typically are more aware of hazards and
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better able to remedy them, typically premises liability duties shift from landlords to tenants. Id
This is not always the case. "The exception to this reasoning is where the landlord created the
hazard him or herself." Id at 534, 376 P.3d at 738. In such instances, both the landlord and
tenant mav simultaneouslv owe nremises liabilitv duties:
.,

.;

.l

...,

Either a tenant, or a landlord, or both, may be liable to a third party for injuries
resulting from negligent repairs or failure to repair. Even in the absence of a
specific lease provision, and with no controlling statute requiring him to make
repairs, if a landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs he is bound to use reasonable
and ordinary care or skill in the execution of the work.
Id. (quoting Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989)).

Finally, in Idaho premises liability law the word "owner" is used broadly -

not to

indicate the individual who owns the property in fee simple, but rather to indicate the individual
or individuals exercising control over the property. See id. at 533, 376 P.3d at 737 ("[A] tenant
or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be
the owner .... " (quoting Harrison, 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329)); Robinson, 156 Idaho at
240, 322 P.3d at 322 (quoting same).
Thus, Stiles holds that:
(i)

more than one party may owe premises liability duties for a single premises;

(ii)

one need not own the premises in fee simple to owe premises liability duties;

(iii)

awareness of and ability to remedy a hazard result in premises liability duties; and

(iv)

creating a hazard -

including by failure to make repairs -

results in premises

liability duties.

18

Stiles supports that the POA owed premises liability duties resulting from its awareness,

ability to remedy, and creation of hazards. It is irrelevant that the POA did not own the premises
in fee simple or that Mr. Switzer also owed premises liability duties.
e.

Policy considerations militate in favor of imposing a duty on the POA.

The POA' s final argument is that imposing a premises-liability duty here would have a
"chilling effect" on similar conduct by other property owners' associations. POA Br. at 22. If
so, good. The central purpose of tort law is to deter harmful conduct. See Jones v. Reagan, 696
F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[I]t has long been one view that deterrence, accomplished
through the setting of standards of conduct and the punishment by means of damage awards ...
is the main function of tort law.") (per Posner, J.). Here, the POA dominated FRPM's actions,
preventing it from taking specific steps that would have protected Ms. Halowell from a severe
brain injury and Mr. Forbush from being killed. It is proper to deter such conduct by holding
Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA accountable for the damages they caused.

2.

Respondents owed duties resulting from their voluntary undertakings.

The parties agree that both an undertaking and reliance are necessary to impose a duty
under a voluntary-undertaking theory.
a.

Respondents engaged in voluntary undertakings.

The POA observes that a "non-response," standing alone, is insufficient to create a
voluntary undertaking. Specifically, the POA quotes Appellant's comment that "Mr. Kalsbeek
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never said that he lacked the power to make this decision [i.e. whether to immediately install
hard-wired CO detectors in all units]." POA Br. at 28 (quoting Appellants' Br. at 21).
If Mr. Kalsbeek's non-response were the only evidence of a voluntary undertaking
regarding hard-wired CO detector installation, the POA would have a valid point. However, the
POA ignores that Mr. Kalsbeek created written Procedures for when hard-wired CO detectors
would be installed, revised those written Procedures (choosing to leave the piecemeal installation
requirements in place), and then orally re-affirmed his Procedures at the October 25 meeting
over Ms. Gaertner's suggestion to fast-track detector installation.

Thus, Mr. Kalsbeek

affirmatively undertook to control hard-wired CO detector installation.

b.

FRPM relied on Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA to make decisions direct result of Mr. Kalsbeek and the PO A's assertion of control.

a

A recurring theme throughout the POA's argument is that FRPM cannot possibly have
relied on the Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA because FRPM owed a duty to repair and maintain unit
interiors, including water heaters. Based on the disputed facts, a reasonable juror could find that
Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA used their financial leverage Kalsbeek -

as well as outright bullying by Mr.

to create a relationship where FRPM needed Respondents' approval to act.

Respondents created this reliance, and must abide by the consequences.
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3.

The POA can be held liable for the acts and omissions of its agent, FRPM. 15
a.

Appellants are not asserting, and have never asserted,
apparent/ostensible (rather than actual) agency. The POA's analysis
of that theory is a red herring.

The POA claims that Appellants conceded actual agency and are pursumg
apparent/ostensible agency instead. POA Br. at 32. Wrong. Appellants have always argued and still maintain -

that the POA's actual control over FRPM created an actual agency

relationship, which cannot be avoided by any contractual disclaimer. R. pp. 358-59; Appellants'
Br. at 24-25. 16
b.

That FRPM was not a dual agent with respect to "grandfathered"
units is irrelevant to FRPM's dual agency in Apartment 4624.

The POA notes that FRPM took no action in the few units where, due to the
"grandfather" clause in § 6.6A of the CCR's, R. p. 96, there was a different property manager.
15

Appellants pursued their agency theory against the POA only. Mr. Kalsbeek's
discussion of the agency issue is superfluous.
16

Appellants' opening brief cited five cases for the proposition that a contractual
disclaimer is not dispositive when the facts show an agency relationship. Appellants' Br. at 2425. The POA notes that in one out of the five cases the underlying theory in which this
proposition of law was discussed was apparent/ostensible agency. POA Br. at 33 (discussing
Barefoot v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 424 F.2d
1001, 1005 (10th Cir. 1970)). The POA ignores that the other four cases all discussed this
proposition of law in the context of actual agency. See Appellants' Br. at 24-25, citing In re M/V
Rickmers Genoa Litig., 622 F. Supp. 2d 56, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Clearly analyzing existence of
actual agency, not apparent/ostensible agency: "Here, a genuine factual issue exists as to whether
ESM Group and ESMT agreed that ESMT would act on ESM Group's account."); Tomlinson v.
G.E. Capital Dealer Distrib. Fin., Inc., 624 So. 2d 565, 567 (Ala. 1993) (clearly analyzing
existence of actual agency, not apparent/ostensible agency; never even using words "apparent"
or "ostensible"); Hylton v. Koontz, 532 S.E.2d 252, 257-58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (same);
Thornton v. Ford Motor Co., 297 P.3d 413,419 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (Stating: "[i]f the facts
show actual control by the principal, an agency is established regardless of the contract
language" in section titled "Actual Authority.").
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POA Br. at 34. According to the POA, if FRPM were a dual agent, it would have taken action in
the "grandfathered" units too. This is not necessarily so. It makes sense that FRPM was a dual
agent for those units where it managed all aspects of the unit, but not a dual agent for those units
comnanv
was senarntelv hired to -------om:mi:re the
where a different orooertv rnana!!ement
u
---- unit
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The POA has not refuted dual agency with respect to Apartment 4624 as a matter of law.

4.

Mr. Kalsbeek can be held individually liable for his own tortious conduct.
a.

A corporate officer can be held liable for specific direction of, active
participation in, and knowing acquiescence to tortious conduct. It is
not required that the officer act outside of the scope of their duties.

Mr. Kalsbeek misunderstands the standard for when a corporate officer or director can be
held liable for his or her own acts or omissions. The standard is not that the officer or director
must act outside the scope of his or her duties. Rather, it is sufficient that the officer or director
specifically directs, actively participates in, or knowingly acquiesces to tortious conduct. See
Appellants' Br. at 26 (quoting VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 334, 109 P.3d 714, 722
(2005); Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404-05, 848 P.2d 984, 988-89 (Ct. App. 1992))
Idaho's common law is fully compatible with LC. § 30-30-406, which provides: "A
member of a corporation is not, as such, personally liable for the acts, debts, liabilities or
obligations of the corporation." Thus, a member of a corporation is not vicariously liable for the
corporation's torts merely because he or she is a member. Rather, specific direction, active
participation, or knowing acquiescence is required.
Mr. Kalsbeek's protestations that he did not participate in a voluntary undertaking "aside
and apart from his role as an officer of the POA," Kalsbeek Br. at 20, and that he did not
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personally attempt to install a detector or repair a water heater, id. at 22-23, are irrelevant. There
is ample evidence that Mr. Kalsbeek specifically directed, actively participated in, and
knowingly acquiesced to tortious conduct. For example, Mr. Kalsbeek promulgated Procedures
for the piecemeal installation of hard-wired CO detectors, objected to hiring a professional
plumber to perform preventative maintenance, and specifically forbade FRPM from sending any
adequate warnings. Appellants are not seeking to hold Mr. Kalsbeek vicariously liable for the
POA's torts

rather, they are seeking to hold him directly liable for his own torts.
b.

Whether Mr. Kalsbeek is immune is an issue for the District Court to
resolve in the first instance. But, to the extent this Court reaches this
issue, it would be improper to grant summary judgment as the
material facts are disputed.

Mr. Kalsbeek correctly notes that the District Court did not rule on his immunity
arguments. Kalsbeek Br. at 26. Typically, when a district court does not rule on an issue particularly one that is factually intensive

this Court remands for the district court to

determine that issue in the first instance. See Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147
Idaho 774, 784, 215 P.3d 494, 504 (2009) (remanding for district court to resolve issues that
were not addressed in its grant of summary judgment); Hill v. Sligar, 128 Idaho 858, 861, 920
P.2d 74, 77 (1996) (stating that it is "[i]n accordance with proper appellate procedure" not to
address issue that district court did not reach below).

It is not surprising that the District Court declined to address Mr. Kalsbeek's immunity
argument, given the undeveloped state of the record. As previously noted, Mr. Kalsbeek' s only
support for his affirmative defense of immunity was an affidavit that copied the elements of LC.
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§ 30-30-623 verbatim rather than setting forth any evidentiary facts. Appellants moved to strike

Mr. Kalsbeek's affidavit on that basis. 17 R. pp. 660-61; R. Aug. pp. 1-6, 15-19. The District
Court never ruled on Appellants' Motion to Strike. The District Court must decide this issue on
remand.

5.

Respondents' finger-pointing at others does not absolve them of their own
duties.

Respondents attempt to shift the blame away from themselves to tenant Adra Kipper,
owner Matthew Switzer, and FRPM

but fail to argue that any intervening, superseding cause

that absolves Respondents of all liability. See Sharp v. W. H Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 302,
796 P.2d 506, 511 (1990) (discussing superseding cause defense). "It has long been the law in
Idaho that there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury." See Idaho Dep 't of Labor
v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 211, 91 P.3d 1111, 1115 (2004). At most, Respondents'

arguments go to fault-apportionment, which is a factually intensive matter for the jury. 18

17

Mr. Kalsbeek claims
citing only his own affidavit - that it is "undisputed"
that he acted in good faith, with ordinary care, and in a manner he reasonably believed was in the
best interests of the owners and the POA. Kalsbeek Br. at 28. Appellants never stipulated that
the conclusory statements in Mr. Kalsbeek' s affidavit were true. Rather, Appellants moved to
strike the affidavit. Appellants also argued that evidence in the record disproves Mr. Kalsbeek's
affidavit. R. pp. 661-62. Therefore, Mr. Kalsbeek' s assertion that Appellants "chose not to rebut
Mr. Kalsbeek's affidavit below" is false. Kalsbeek Br. at 28.
18

The jury may apportion fault to a party (or nonparty) only if all the elements of
that entity's negligence are established. See Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 687, 39 P.3d
621, 627 (2001). Whether Ms. Kipper, Mr. Switzer, or FRPM were negligent, and if so to what
extent, are hotly disputed factual questions.
For example, Respondents attempt to blame Mr. Switzer for failing to replace his water
heaters. See, e.g. Kaisbeek Br. at 9. The jury might well turn the blame back on Mr. Kalsbeek
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III.

CONCLUSION

Because numerous disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment, Appellants
respectfully request that this Court reverse and
defenses.
Dated this 27th day of September, 2016.
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and the POA. Mr. Kalsbeek commanded FRPM maintenance supervisor Sheila Thomason not to
reveal the Ben Davis Letter to owners such as Mr. Switzer. R. p. 406 at Dep. p. 140, L. 18 to p.
141, L. 7. The Ben Davis Letter warned of the imminent risk of death due to CO poisoning. R.
pp. 701-02. Had Mr. Switzer received the dire Ben Davis Letter, he might well have replaced his
water heaters.
Another example is Respondents' criticism of Ms. Kipper for not replacing the batteries
in the temporary CO detector that FRPM gave her. POA Br. at 21-22 & n.4; Kalsbeek Br. at 8,
10. Strangely, the POA cites lease provisions dealing with smoke detectors - not temporary CO
detectors
to claim that Ms. Kipper had a duty to replace the batteries. POA Br. at 22 n.4
39(1) and (2), 1 42). Respondents omit that Ms. Kipper was told that
(citing R. pp. 192-93 at
the detector was merely temporary, "for safety precautions until your water heater can be
replaced next week." R. p. 239. Ms. Kipper was even instructed not to attach the temporary
detector to her wall. Id. And, although it was merely temporary, Ms. Kipper nonetheless
replaced the batteries three times before failing to do so immediately on a fourth occasion. R.
Aug. p. 41 at Dep. p. 42, L. 19 to p. 45, L. 11. The factual disputes run deeper, but the point is
obvious: summary judgment cannot be based on an apportionment of fault.

n
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